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Using the labor union’s bargaining power as an indication of government policy on labor 
standards issues, we analyze the competition between a domestic (North) firm and a foreign 
(South) firm, and their relationship with optimal labor standards (LS). First, we show that 
the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when 
they are not. Second, it is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if 
labor unions are employment-oriented. Third, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS occurs in the 
case of wage-oriented unions. Fourth, the North’s imposing a tariff to force the Southern 
government to raise its LS is effective only if the Southern union is wage-oriented. In order 
to raise Southern LS, both countries may need some deeper form of economic integration, 
if the North does not want to abandon its free trade system.  
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1. Introduction 
The issue of Labor standards (LS) has been one of the focal points in meetings of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in recent years. For instance, the U.S. and France discussed LS and proposed a 
“social clause”
1 at WTO meetings in Singapore in 1996 and Seattle in 1999; The European Union 
also brought such issues to the WTO’s Doha conference in 2001. Labor unions and humanitarian 
organizations argue that without international agreements, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS could arise.  
This movement has met strong opposition from developing countries, who argue that a higher LS 
may increase labor costs and thus reduce their competitiveness. 
In the existing theoretical literature, LS has been treated broadly as a source of externality in a 
general equilibrium framework, such that it is assumed to directly increase consumer utility or 
national welfare.
2 Brown et al. (1996) investigate the welfare effect of LS under free trade. 
Srinivasan (1996) considers whether different LS levels among countries change their incentives for 
free trade. Bagwell and Staiger (1998, 2001a, 2001b) analyze the interaction between negotiations 
over trade policy and LS. In particular, they show that a positive tariff and a lower LS are policy 
substitutes. They emphasize the role of international negotiation on trade and LS policies in order to 
avoid a race to the bottom of LS. Unlike them, Chau and Kanbur (2006) investigate how Northern 
tariffs affect the incentives of Southern exporting countries to raise LS without international 
cooperation. They show that whether a race to the bottom of LS arises or not depends on the 
Northern demand curve, the size of big exporters relative to each other, and the relative size of the 
competitive fringe of small exporters. 
In these analyses, however, neither workers nor firms are explicitly modeled, and thus it is hard to 
see how they are affected by LS and how governments view LS policies regarding their effects on 
firm profits, worker utility and consumer welfare. In the present paper, we wish to model these 
explicitly. We examine the endogenous choice of LS in a model of international duopoly, in which 
a domestic firm competes against a foreign exporting firm.  
In particular, we introduce two different elements. First, we analyze LS in the context of labor-
management negotiations, highlighting how LS affects worker utility and firm profits. We treat the 
bargaining power of labor unions as a government policy variable on LS, emphasizing the role of 
governments. This treatment is based on some stylized facts and empirical studies. One of the four 
                                                 
1 The ‘social clause’ would permit restrictions to be imposed on imports from countries not complying with an agreed 
level of minimum LS. 
2 As a more specific type of LS, the implication of child-labor practices in developing countries for international trade has 
drawn quite some attention. For instance, see Basu (1999).   2 
Core Labor Standards proposed by the International Labor Organization (ILO) is ‘freedom of 
association and the effective recognition of the rights to collective bargaining’,
3 which basically 
represents how strong the union is vs. the firm. According to studies by Moene and Wallerstein 
(2003), Sweden and Norway have experienced almost full employment after World War II. They 
attribute this extraordinary phenomenon to the union’s strong bargaining power, which is seen as a 
symbol of high LS in Scandinavia.  
Second, our model allows the labor union to have a biased preference toward either wages or 
employment, as in Pemberton (1988), Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991), Zhao (2001) and López and 
Nalyor (2004).
 4 This consideration allows us to examine different firm performances arising out of 
the union’s preference, how it affects the government’s optimal choice of LS, and more importantly 
the issue of a race to the bottom of the LS in the context of union preferences over wages and 
employment. Certainly this treatment also has empirical support. In an interesting survey of British 
trade unions, Clark and Oswald (1993) find that union preferences are more heavily weighted 
toward employment than would be implied by the so-called rent-maximization behavior (i.e., 
maximizing the sum of union members’ rents), even though union leaders care more about wages 
than employment. Further, it is argued that unions tend to be employment-oriented during recession, 
when securing jobs is a priority. In contrast, during business boom, they tend to be wage-oriented 
and have stronger demands for wage hikes. In addition, in a rich country, unions might be 
concerned more about increasing the size of union membership than wages, while union workers in 
poor countries might be more interested in the wage level, given that many non-union workers are 
earning near subsistence-level wages. Thus, in the present model we assume the union and the firm 
negotiate over two issues, wages and employment, and the negotiated equilibrium would depend on 
the union’s preference.  
Regarding the optimal choices of LS under free trade versus optimal tariff systems and their 
impacts on firms, unions and consumers, we find that, firstly, an increase in LS can raise the 
domestic firm’s profit and reduce that of the foreign firm if labor unions are sufficiently 
                                                 
3 The other three are (i) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor; (ii) the effective abolition of child 
labor; and (iii) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment occupation. See International Labour Office 
(1999). 
4 They analyze how the domestic labor union’s exogenous bargaining power affects the formation of tariffs, trade volume, 
union utility, national welfare and foreign direct investment. In contrast, we take into account both domestic and foreign 
labor unions and endogeneize their respective bargaining  powers. We explicitly  allow  the  domestic labor union’s 
bargaining power to affect the foreign negotiated wage, output and profits. This enables us to further investigate the 
interactions between the two countries’ choice of optimal LS. Consequently, the Southern government’s choice of LS 
affects the choice of the Northern government and vice versa.   3 
employment-oriented. This arises because employment-oriented unions are willing to sacrifice 
some wage demands for higher employment. An increase in LS via a rise in union bargaining power 
raises the domestic firm’s output and reduces that of the foreign firm. The opposite is true, if labor 
unions are sufficiently wage-oriented.  
Secondly, the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when 
they are wage-oriented. In our model of duopoly, firms produce “too little” output. Hence, 
governments have incentives to set higher LS if this raises output, which happens if unions are 
employment-oriented. In addition, the government is willing to grant higher LS/bargaining power to 
more employment-oriented unions.  
Thirdly, the optimal level of LS is lower under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if 
unions are wage-oriented. If unions are employment oriented, the opposite is true. Free trade is not 
an optimal policy for an importing country under oligopoly. In fact, the importing country’s 
government has an incentive to lower LS if it increases the firms’ output, which is the case of wage-
oriented unions. In contrast, it will choose to raise LS to increase output in the case of employment-
oriented unions. 
 In addition to the above results, we believe that a contribution to the literature is our findings on 
the race to the bottom of LS. First, we show that we may observe ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS only 
in the case of wage-oriented labor unions. Lowering the LS in a country decreases the negotiated 
wage rate, and with wage-oriented unions, it also strategically reduces the rival’s profits by taking 
some of the rival’s market share away. As an optimal response, the other country may also reduce 
its LS. Second, the importing country’s imposing a tariff to force the other country to raise its LS is 
effective only if the union in the latter country is wage-oriented. Alternatively, in order to raise the 
latter’s LS, both countries may need a deeper form of economic integration (i.e., joint welfare 
maximization) if the importing country’s government does not want to give up its free trade system. 
 
2. The Basic Model Setup 
Consider two countries, the North (N) and the South (S), each having one firm, i.e., respectively N 
and S. Both firms produce an identical product which is sold in country N only,
5 under the 
following inverse demand function,  ) ( S N q q p p + = , with  0 '< p , where  i q  denotes the output of 
firm i, for  , iNS = . The Northern government imposes a tariff t on imports from the South. 
                                                 
5 Since LS issues arise out of North’s claims that low Southern LS helps to improve South’s competitiveness in the North, 
we ignore what might be going on in the S market, though it should be straightforward to introduce a segmented S market.   4 
Firms: Labor is the only input required to produce the outputs in a one-to-one ratio by a proper 
choice of units. Given a wage rate of  i w , firm i’s profits can be written respectively as: 
( ), ( ) N NN S SS S pwq pwq t q ππ = − = −− .        (1) 
Labor markets: In both countries, workers are organized into unions. The union utility in each 
country can be represented by this simple function: 
i ii u wq
β = ,                   (2) 
where  0 > β  is a parameter for union bias toward wages (See Pemberton (1988), Mezzetti and 
Dinopoulos (1991), and López and Nalyor (2004) for a similar definition). That is, if  1 > β , then 
the union is said to be wage-oriented (more interested in wages than employment); if  1 < β , then 
the union is said to be employment-oriented (less interested in wages than employment); and finally 
if  1 = β , then the union is said to be neutral. 
Wages and employment are negotiated between the union and the firm in each country. We adopt 
Nash bargaining to determine the negotiation equilibrium: 
i i
i i i i i u q w G
θ θ π
− =
1 ) ( ) ( ) , ( ,              (3) 
where  i θ  is the bargaining power of the union in country i. For reasons discussed in the 
introduction, we use  i θ  to represent the LS in country i and assume that it is determined 
endogenously by country i’s government. 
Governments: We assume that the N and S governments care about each country’s respective 
social welfare including the labor union’s utility as follows:
 6 
( , ) () () N NN N N NS NS S u w q v qq qq p t q π Φ= + + + − + +,      (4a) 
( , ), S S S SS uwq π Φ= +                (4b) 
where in the North, it is the sum of firm profits, union utility, consumer surplus and tariff revenue. 
The term  () NS vq q +  is the utility of consuming  NS qq + , with  '( ) vp ⋅= , and the consumer 
surplus is the utility level minus the expenditure, i.e.,  () () NS NS v qq qq p +−+ . In the South, since 
there is no consumption, national welfare is the firm profits plus union utility.  
                                                 
6 As a referee pointed out, the government objective function could be applied in general equilibrium because labor is the 
only factor and the income earned by the union has already been picked up in the consumer surplus. However, in order to 
highlight the impacts of LS on firm profits, labor-management relations and their interactions with those of the rival 
country, we rely on the current partial equilibrium model. López and Nalyor (2004) also use the same social welfare 
function in a partial equilibrium setting to see the effects of unions on firm’s profit and social welfare.   5 
Game structure: The game has two stages. In the first stage, each government determines its LS 
simultaneously, and the Northern government also determines the import tariff imposed on 
Southern imports; and in the second stage, the labor union and the firm negotiate to determine 
wages and employment in each country simultaneously. To ensure consistency, the game is solved 
by backward induction. 
Equilibrium Solutions: The FOCs (first order conditions) in the second stage are as follows, for 
S N i , = , ij ≠ , 
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where  /0 ii i i q pq p w t π ′ ∂ ∂ = + − −<  with  0 = t  if  N i =  and  0 > t  otherwise. Using (5a), one 
sees that (5b) implies  /0 N NN w pq p w β ′ + +− =  for N and  /0 S SS w pq p w t β ′ + + − −=  for S. 
Without the union, the firm could have maximized its profits by setting  /0 ii q π ∂ ∂= . However, in 
(5b) we have  /0 ii q π ∂ ∂<, implying that in the bargaining equilibrium each firm produces more 
than the level that would maximize its profits. This arises because with positive bargaining power, 
the union can bargain for more employment as well as higher wages. 















































. These FOCs implicitly define the four 
endogenous variables ( S S N N q w q w , , , ) in equilibrium as functions of the three policy variables, 
( t S N , , θ θ ), which are taken as given in stage 2. Then we can endogeneize the optimal choices of 
the policies in stage 1. 
 
3. Comparative Static Analysis   6 
Next we investigate the impact of the three policies imposed by the N and S governments on firms 
and unions. Detailed derivations are relegated to Appendix A1. 
 
3.1  Effects on Outputs and Wages 
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Expression (7a) says that an increase in LS raises the negotiated wage, as expected, since the 
increase in LS raises the union’s bargaining power. Expression (7b) states that an increase in 
country i’s LS raises (reduces) firm i’s output if the union is employment (wage)-oriented. The 
reason is that an employment (wage)-oriented union demands a higher level of employment (wage) 
at the expense of a lower wage (less employment). This effect is strengthened if LS rises.  
Expressions (7c) and (7d) follow expression (7b), reflecting the effects of an increase in country 
i’s LS on country j’s output and wages. Specifically, the sign of (7c) is the exact opposite of (7b), 
because outputs  j q  and  i q  are substitutes. These effects further lead to corresponding changes of 
the negotiated wage in the other country, resulting in (7d).  
In addition, the effects of the Northern tariff can be obtained as follows:  /0 N dq dt > , 
/0 N dw dt > ,  /0 S dq dt < , and  /0 S dw dt < , as expected.    
The above results are important to warrant a lemma. 
 
Lemma 1:   An increase in country i’s LS, (i) raises the negotiated wage in the country, but it 
raises the output only if the labor union is employment-oriented, and lowers it if the union is wage-
oriented; (ii)  reduces the output of the competing country if the union is employment-oriented, and 
raises it if the union is wage-oriented.     7 
 
We can draw some interesting implications from Lemma 1. There exists a hypothesis that a higher 
LS might provide incentives for workers to work harder and thus increase output (see Zhao, 2006, 
who does not model union biases). Our results suggest that the increase in LS does provide 
incentives (in the form of a higher negotiated wage), but it leads to higher output only if the union is 
employment-oriented. If the union is wage-oriented, then an improvement in LS would lower 
outputs instead, because the union might sacrifice employment/output for a higher wage. 
In addition, humanitarian groups, labor unions and politicians in some Northern countries claim 
that a lower LS in the South enables it to be more competitive and sell more in Northern markets. 
Thus, if Southern LS were forced up, Northern firms could sell more and Northern workers gain 
more. Our results in (7c) and (7d) show that this is only true if unions are wage oriented. In this case, 
a rise in the LS in the South should surrender more markets to the Northern firm. In turn, the 
Northern union can also gain by bargaining for higher wages and employment. 
  
3.2  Effects on Firm Profits 
How is firm profitability affected? First, let us check whether a rise in LS in a country raises the 
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In the first equation, while the first term on the RHS (right hand side) is positive since 
/0 ii dw dθ >  as in (7a), the second term is positive if  1 β <  and negative if  1 β >  as in (7b). In 
the second equation, both terms are positive if  1 β >  and negative if  1 β < . Hence we can 
summarize the net effect in the following lemma.  
 
Lemma 2: (i)  /0 ii dC dθ >  for a large domain of  (0, ) ββ ∈  with  (1 3, ) β ∈+ ∞ ; and (ii) 
/0 ji dC dθ >  if  1 β >  and  /0 ji dC dθ <  if  1 β <  (See Appendix A2). 
 
Observe that the above result implies that the bargaining power granted the union works as a 
costly factor to firm’s production activities, which is in line with the conventional wisdom that an 
increase in LS would raise production costs and lower profits.    8 
However, this conventional wisdom is only partially correct in the present model. Appendix A3 
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First, (8a) and (8b) say that an increase in LS raises firm profits if the labor union is sufficiently 
employment-oriented, but reduces them otherwise. The first part is against conventional wisdom. 
Suppose that unions are employment-oriented. The increase in Northern LS raises the union wage 
and employment by (7a) and (7b), but it also lowers the Southern firm’s employment and thus 
output by (7c). The former two effects work negatively to the Northern firm’s profits through costs, 
while the last effect intensifies competition in the market. If the unions are sufficiently 
employment-oriented (
* ββ <  for the North and 
** ββ <  for the South), the competition effect 
may outweigh the cost effect and as a result the Northern firm’s profit increases. 
Next, (8c) shows that an increase in LS in a country reduces firm profits in the other country if 
labor unions are employment-oriented, but it raises them otherwise. With employment-oriented 
unions, an increase in Southern LS reduces the Northern employment by (7c), which deteriorates 
the Northern firm’s competitiveness in the market. This effect may dominate the beneficial effect 
on costs (as through (7c) and (7d)), and thus the Northern firm’s profit decreases. 
Finally, (8d) is as expected, saying that the tariff increases the profit of the Northern firm but 
reduces that of the Southern one. We summarize these results as: 
 
Proposition 1:  An increase in country i’s LS, (i) lowers the profit of this country, unless the union 
is sufficiently employment oriented, in which case it may raise the profit; (ii) reduces (raises) the 
profit of the competing country if the union is employment (wage) oriented.  
   9 
This proposition implies that when LS is treated as exogenous, regulations to raise the Southern 
LS may hurt the Northern firm if the Southern union is employment oriented, contrary to the 
original intensions of Northern labor activists and other Northern interest groups who lobby to force 
up Southern LS. However, such regulations are effective if the union is wage oriented, because in 
this case it increases the rival’s costs. This result contrasts with that of Mezzetti and Dinopoulos 
(1991), who only study the case of one domestic union. In their model, an exogenous increase in the 
(domestic) union’s bargaining power has an ambiguous effect on domestic profits when the union is 
employment oriented. In the present model, we show clearly that the domestic profits increase if 
unions are sufficiently employment-oriented, and decrease otherwise. The difference arises because 
our model has both domestic and foreign labor unions. And the LS changes in one country affect 
actions of the union and firm in the other country strategically.  
 
3.3  Effects on Union Utility 
Next, we look into the effects of an increase in LS on union utility. For  , , ;  ij NS i j = ≠ , 
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= +       (9) 
In the first equation, the first term on the RHS is positive since  /0 ii dw dθ >  as in (7a); and the 
second term is positive if β <1 and negative if β >1 as in (7b). In the second equation, both terms 
are positive if  1 β >  and negative if  1 β <  as in (7c) and (7d). Here we summarize the net effects 
in the following lemma.  
 
Lemma 3: (i)  /0 ii du dθ >  for  ( ) 0, β ∈∞  and (ii)  /0 ji du dθ >  if  1 β >  and  /0 ji du dθ <  if 
1 β <  (See Appendix A4 for proof). 
 
This lemma shows that a higher LS increases the union’s utility regardless of its preference toward 
wages versus employment. Interestingly, it can also increase the foreign labor union’s utility if the 
labor unions are wage-oriented; and decreases it if they are employment-oriented. That is, raising a 
foreign country’s LS does not necessarily increase the union utility in this country. Intuitively, for 
instance, if the union has high bargaining power in the North and it cares more for wages than   10 
employment, then it will push the Northern firm to increase wages and cut output. This will 
surrender more markets to the Southern firm and in turn increase Southern wages or employment. 
And the Northern tariff has the following effects: 
0
N N N NN
NN
du u dw u dq
dt w dt q dt
β = +> ,            (10a) 
0
S S S SS
SS
du u dw u dq
dt w dt q dt
β = +< ,            (10b)   
because  / N dw dt  and  / N dq dt  are positive and  / S dw dt  and  / S dq dt  are negative (see section 
3.1 and Appendix A1). As expected, a higher tariff protection of the North against the South would 
effectively increase the Northern union wage, employment and thus utility, regardless of the union’s 
preference toward wages and employment. And exactly the opposite applies to the Southern union. 
 
3.4  Effects on Consumer Surplus 
Since output is consumed in the North only, its consumer surplus can be expressed as 












= −+                           
where  p v = '  and  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) / ' / 1 1 1/ N S N S N NN S dq q d pq qw θ βπ θ β β β + = ∆ + −+ − , 
which is positive if β <1 and negative if β >1. Thus, if the unions are employment oriented, an 
increase in LS raises the total quantities provided by both firms, lowering the market price. As a 
result, consumers benefit. However, if the unions are biased toward wages, a higher LS reduces 
their negotiated employments and the total quantities provided in the market as well, increasing the 
market price and lowering consumer surplus.  
 
4. Optimal LS and Tariffs 
In this section we solve for optimal policies in terms of LS and tariffs, by maximizing national 
welfare consisting of consumer surplus, firm profits, labor union utility and the tariff revenue, 
wherever applicable. 
 
4.1  The Northern Government   11 
    By substitution, the North’s welfare function in (4a) can be rewritten as: 
( ) (,) N N S S NN N N N S v q q pq w q u w q tq Φ= + − − + + .  Differentiation yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )
() N NS S S NN N
S NN NN
N N N N NN N
d q q dq dq q dw dq
p p q p t ww ww
d d d wd d
ββ β
θ θ θθ θ θ
    ∂Φ + ′ = − − + + − +−     ∂    
where  p v = ' ,  ( )/ NS N dq q d θ +  is positive if  1 < β  and negative if  1 > β  (see Section 3.4).  
If  1 < β , the first square bracket on the RHS is positive and the second one is negative. If  1 > β , 
then the signs are reversed. And regardless of β , the last bracket is negative. To find out the 
optimal Northern LS, we solve  /0 NN θ ∂Φ ∂ =  for  N θ . Let us denote it by 
*
N θ . 
On the other hand, the welfare-maximizing optimal tariff is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
() N NS S S NN N
S S NN NN
N
d q q dq dq q dw dq
p p q t qp ww ww
t dt dt dt w dt dt
ββ β
 ∂Φ +    ′ = − + +− + − + −     ∂   
where  ( ) ( ) ( )/ ' 1 1 0 N S NS S d q q dt p q q θβ + =−+<. 
The first bracket is negative. The second one is positive, provided that the tariff is small. And the 
third one depends on β : It is negative if  1 < β  and positive if  1 > β . However, we can show that 
the optimal tariff 
* t  must be positive. The proof is straightforward: Suppose  0 /| 0 Nt t ≤ ∂Φ ∂ = . 
Substituting  0 t =  into the long expression above for  / N t ∂Φ ∂ , we obtain  0 /| 0 Nt t = ∂Φ ∂ >  
because of  ( ) /0 S t dq dt < , resulting in a contradiction. 
 
4.2  The Southern Government 
Maximizing (4b) yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )
()
'
S NS SS S S
S SS SS
S S SS S S
d q q q dw dq dq
p q w w pt w w
d wd d d
ββ β
θθ θ θ θ
    ∂Φ +
=+ − +− + −     ∂    
 
where  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )/ ' / 1 1 1 / N S S N S SS N dq q d pq qw θ βπ θ β β β + = ∆ + −+ −  is positive if 
1 < β  and negative if  1 > β .   If  1 < β , the first bracket on the RHS is negative and the second 
one is positive; if  1 > β , the first bracket becomes positive and the second becomes negative. 
Regardless of β , the last bracket is negative. To find out the optimal Southern LS, we may solve 
/0 SS θ ∂Φ ∂ =  for  S θ . We will denote it 
*
S θ .    12 
 
4.3  Reaction Functions of LS 
We first calculate the reaction function of the Northern government and show that it is positively 






























The second order condition for welfare maximization requires that the denominators are negative. 
Thus the slopes of the reaction functions depend on the numerator. From the FOCs, it is not difficult 
to verify that 
2 /0 N NS θθ ∂Φ ∂ ∂ >  if  1 β <  and 
2 /0 N NS θθ ∂Φ ∂ ∂ <  if  1 β > . Consequently, 
/0 NS dd θθ >  if  1 β <  and   /0 NS dd θθ <  if  1 β > . Due to similar structures of firms and unions 
between the two countries, the reaction function of the Southern government should behave in a 
similar fashion.  
Each of the reaction functions given a value of β  tells us how a country optimally responds to the 
change of the other country’s choice of LS. Consider a case that the Southern government reduces 
its LS level for some reason. How does this affect the Northern government’s optimal choice of LS? 
If unions are employment-oriented ( 1 β < ), lemma 2 says that the lower LS of the South increases 
the Northern firm’s costs. Consequently the Northern government will respond to it by reducing its 
LS as well. On the other hand if unions are wage-oriented ( 1 β > ), the Northern firm’s costs will 
fall and hence the Northern government can afford to set a higher LS. The optimal LS levels of both 
countries are determined where the two reaction curves meet. In the following section, we will 
analyze the properties of the optimal LS policies. 
 
4.4  The Analysis 
 
Proposition 2: Regardless of the tariff system, the optimal LS in each country is weaker if  1 > β  
than if  1 < β . That is, 
**
11 || ii ββ θθ >< <  (See Appendix A5 for proof). 
 
Figure 1 shows the level of optimal LS which maximizes the welfare function for the cases of 
wage-oriented and employment-oriented unions. The optimal LS is lower when unions are wage-  13 
oriented, because the marginal impact of LS on the objective function is negative with wage-
oriented unions when it is evaluated with the optimal LS. Detailed explanations follow. 
 
 
Wage-oriented unions pursue higher wages at the expense of a lower negotiated employment, 
raising the firm’s costs, and lowering its profitability and consumer output. As a consequence, the 
government may try to reduce the union’s bargaining power by choosing a lower LS. The opposite 
arises for the case of employment-oriented unions. The intuition is simple. In our model of duopoly, 
the firms produce “too little” in the market. Consequently, governments have incentives to set 
higher LS if it raises output, which happens if unions are employment-oriented. And the opposite is 
true if unions are wage-oriented. This finding is associated with the argument of ‘a race to the 
bottom’, which we will further discuss later in Proposition 4.  
Next, we investigate how the tariff affects the Northern LS compared with free trade. 
 
Proposition 3: Each country’s LS is lower under the optimal tariff than under free trade if  1 < β , 
and the opposite is true if  1 β > . Formally (see Appendix A6 for proof), 
(i) If  1 < β , then  *
**
0 0 || i it t θθ = > < ;  (ii) If  1 > β , then  *
**
0 0 || i it t θθ = > > . 
 
i θ   ii θθ
+−  


















ε β − =
− 1   ε β + =
+ 1  
Figure 1: LS - wage vs. employment oriented unions   14 
Figure 2 shows the welfare and the optimal LS for the cases of wage and employment oriented 
unions. First, in both cases, we observe that the optimal tariff level is positive, i.e., the welfare level 
is higher under the optimal tariff system than under zero tariff. Second, the LS is affected by the 
tariff system; That is, the LS is higher (lower) under free trade than under a positive tariff if unions 
are employment (wage) oriented. In particular, we show for each case that the marginal impact of 
LS on the objective function with employment (wage) oriented unions is positive (negative) when it 
is evaluated at the optimal LS. The intuition for the results is as follows. 
 
 
The positive impact of a small tariff on the importing country’s welfare, given that the demand 
curve is not too convex, is a standard result in trade literature such as Eaton and Grossman (1986). 
This result helps us to compare the optimal LS under free trade and under the optimal tariff 
respectively. The optimal level of LS is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff if 
unions are employment-oriented, and the opposite is true if unions are wage oriented. The intuition 
can be explained as follows. Free trade is not an optimal policy for the importing country. Hence, 
the importing Northern government has an incentive to raise LS if it increases outputs, which is the 
case of employment-oriented unions, but it will decrease LS to increases the firm’s output in the 
case of wage-oriented unions. And the Southern government would change its LS similarly in order 
to avoid the negative cost effect from the change of the Northern LS (see Lemma 2). 
i Φ  
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i θ  
0
* > t  
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Figure 2: LS - optimal tariff vs. free trade   15 
Proposition 3 implies that imposing a tariff to force the South to raise its LS is only effective if the 
union is wage-oriented. If the union is employment-oriented, the South would choose a lower LS in 
response to Northern pressure. Thus, it further implies that trade liberalization in the North may 
raise Southern LS in the latter case, which is in line with the argument that the best way to raise 
Southern LS is to keep Northern markets open. In addition, this case confirms the empirical 
findings of Neumayer and Soysa (2006) that countries that are more open to trade have fewer rights 
violations than more closed ones. 
Next, we examine the issue of ‘a race to the bottom’ in LS. 
 
Proposition 4:  A race to the bottom of LS arises only under two conditions: each government 
does not care about union utility, or the union is sufficiently wage-oriented. In other cases, it does 
not arise (See Appendix A7 for proof). 
 
This proposition states that ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS can be observed with sufficiently wage-
oriented labor unions or if the governments ignore the unions’ welfare. Although the latter case is 
obvious, the former case is worth noting. The intuition is, lowering the LS in a country decreases 
the production cost there by reducing the negotiated wage rate, and simultaneously it strategically 
increases the rival’s production costs in the other country by taking some of the rival’s market share 
away. As a response, the other country may also reduce its own LS.  
 
5. Some Extensions 
In this section we introduce two extensions to the basic model. One is to incorporate asymmetric 
labor unions in terms of preferences across countries and the other is to look into the effects of 
economic integration. We analyze how these affect LS choices in the two countries. 
  
5.1  Asymmetric Labor Unions 
So far, we have treated both labor unions as having identical preferences towards wage versus 
employment. What if this is not the case? Here we can consider four asymmetric cases:  Firstly, the 
Northern labor union is wage-oriented while the Southern union is employment-oriented, i.e., 
1 N β >  and  1 S β < . Secondly, the Northern union is employment oriented while Southern union 
is wage oriented, i.e.,  1 N β <  and  1 S β > . Thirdly, the union is more wage oriented in country i   16 
than that in country, j, i.e.,  1 ij ββ >> . Lastly, the union is more employment-oriented in country i 
than that in j, i.e.,  1 ij ββ << . We also examine the first two cases with and without free trade. The 
results can be summarized as follows. 
   
Proposition 5: When the labor unions in the two countries have asymmetric preferences over 




1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 | | ||
N N SS Nt Nt StSt β β ββ θ θ θθ >= >><> <= <<< , 
(ii) 
** **
1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 1, 0 || ||








ij ij ii ββ β β θθ =< << <  for a given tariff t. 
 
It is quite common to observe that developed countries sustain relatively higher labor standards 
than developing countries. The above Proposition shows that this may be a reflection of different 
preferences of their labor unions: The Northern union may be more interested in employment than 
the Southern one. And in the extreme case that the Northern union is employment oriented while 
the Southern one is wage oriented, the LS differential between the two countries is the highest 
under free trade. 
 
5.2  Economic Integration and Southern LS 
Does regional economic integration increase LS? From Proposition 3, the S government may 
choose a higher LS under the optimal tariff system than under free trade if labor unions are wage-
oriented. Put another way, this implies that the Northern tariff on Southern imports is an effective 
way to raise Southern LS if labor unions are wage-oriented. 
In this section, we further investigate the issue of economic integration. In particular, what we 
have in mind is the effect of some Southern countries’ accessions to the World Trade Organization 
or to the European Union, where member countries lose their discretionary choice of import tariffs 
(i.e., internal free trade is mandatory). And they may as well cooperate over non-tariff issues such 
as LS. Our question is whether such a deeper economic integration increases their LS or not.   17 
To see this formally, we change the game structure as follows. In the first stage, both governments 
determine their LS cooperatively, and the Northern government abides by the agreed-upon zero 
tariff; and in the second stage, the labor union and the firm negotiate to determine wages and 
employment in each country simultaneously. 
The second stage of the game can be solved as in earlier sections. Now to find out the optimal LS, 
both governments maximize their joint welfare choosing the two LS, given a zero-tariff system. 

















Let us denote the Northern optimal LS as 
E
N θ  and the Southern one as 
E
S θ , where the superscript E 
stands for economic integration. We are now in a position to compare whether 
E
i θ  is greater or 
smaller than the optimal LS, 
*
i θ ,  under the full discretionary regime over tariffs and LS in previous 
sections.  
 
Proposition 6: After economic integration, if countries cooperate over LS, (i) they tend to choose 
higher LS than in the absence of economic integration if labor unions are wage-oriented; (ii) If 
labor unions are employment-oriented, the effect of economic integration on LS is ambiguous (See 
Appendix A9 for proof). 
 
The implications of the above proposition are interesting. Suppose that labor unions are wage-
oriented. Then the free trade system of the North results in a lower LS in the South as compared to 
under the optimal tariff, as shown in Proposition 3. And in order for the North to raise Southern LS, 
it must abandon the free trade regime and impose a positive tariff against Southern imports. 
However, Proposition 6 says that if both countries cooperate over the LS to maximize their joint 
welfare under the free trade system, then it is possible for the North to induce the Southern 
government to choose a higher LS, without giving up the free trade regime.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, with a setting of a Northern firm competing against a Southern exporter in the 
Northern market, we investigated how governments set LS when labor unions have a biased 
preference towards either wages or employment. The following main results are noteworthy. First,   18 
given any tariff level, governments choose higher LS when labor unions are employment-oriented 
than when they are wage-oriented. Second, the optimal LS is higher under free trade than under the 
optimal tariff if labor unions are employment-oriented. Last, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS may arise 
if unions are wage-oriented, and it is more so under free trade than under the optimal tariff. 
We extended the analysis to two more interesting cases. First, we considered asymmetric 
preferences of labor unions. We found that the North sets higher LS than the South, when the 
Northern union is more employment-oriented than the Southern union. Second, we considered the 
effect of economic integration between the North and the South on their LS decisions. We showed 
that both countries can cooperatively choose higher LS in order to maximize their joint welfare 
even if their labor unions are wage-oriented.  
Another interesting extension would be to introduce multinational corporations and foreign 
direct investment, where the Northern firm has a Southern branch and it bargains with the Southern 
labor union. The Northern multinational firm can use this situation as a threat against the Northern 
labor union as well as the Southern one, in case either of the negotiations breaks down. The threat 
of going multinational would reduce the union wage premium regardless of union preferences. 
However, the Southern labor union has a better position than the Northern one since it deals with 
two firms, the Southern firm and the Southern branch of the Northern firm. This would positively 
affect the negotiated wage and employment. The final effect might be ambiguous. We leave it for 
future studies.   19 
Appendix  
A1: Proof for (7a), (7b), (7b) and (7d) 
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The determinant of the 4x4 matrix on the LHS can be expanded as: 
   
2 22 2 2 22 2 2
2 2 22
1 NS N S NS N S N S
NS
N S N S NS SN S N NN SS
GG G G
w w q q qq qq q q wq wq
ππ π π π π β
βθ βθ
β
  ∂∂ ∂ ∂   ∂ ∂ ∂∂ − ∂ ∂
∆=− + −    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂∂   
We have  (1 ) ii i ii qw βθπ θ = −  for i=N, S from (6a), and  /' 0 N NN w pq p w β + +− =  and 
/' 0 SS S w pq p t w β + + −− =  from (6b). Multiplying  i βθ  to the second equations in (6b) and 













the 2nd bracket on the RHS of ∆  zero. Hence, ∆>0 provided that the own effects (the 1st term in 
1st bracket) dominate the cross effects (the rest of terms in 1st bracket).    20 
For simplicity we evaluate the comparative static results at  "0 p = . (Our results hold as long as 
the marginal revenue is decreasing in output, i.e., as long as  '' p  is not extremely positive.) Then we 
obtain the results shown in section 3.1 as follows. For  ,, ij NS =  and ij ≠ ; 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 2 13 ' 0
i







∆ = −+ + >, 
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βθ ∆ = −∆ < .   QED 
 
A2: Proof for Lemma 2  
(i) We only prove the case for the North. That for the South can be done analogously. Detailed 
calculations yield: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 / 2 ( 1) 3 ( 1) ( 1) 2 ' / N N S N S NS N N N dC d q q p q w θ θβ β θθβ β π = −+− − −+ + ∆   . 
The sign of the expression in square brackets depends on the value of β . First, if β <1, it is 
positive. Second, if β >1, we set the expression in brackets equal to zero and solve for β , which 
gives: 
22 ( )/( ) N S NS N S NS NS β θ θ θθ θ θ θθ θθ = −++ + ++ . Here  0 β >  for  ( ) 0,1 i θ ∈ . In 
particular,  (1 3, ) β ∈+ ∞ , and  13 β = +  when  1 i θ = , while β = ∞ when  0 i θ = . Therefore, 
Lemma 2(i) holds for a large domain of  (0, ) ββ ∈  with  (1 3, ) β ∈+ ∞ . The proof for Lemma 
2(ii) is straightforward from (7c) and (7d).   QED 
 
A3: Proof for (8a), (8b), (8c) and (8d)    21 
( )[ ] ( ) ' / ( 1)( ( 1) 2)( ) ' ( (2 ) (1 )) .
N
N NN S S N N S S
N
d
qw pq p w pq
d
π
βπ β β θ β β θ θ
θ
= + ∆ − −+ − − + ++
After some calculations, we can verify that  / NN dd πθ  is negative if 
* β β >  and positive if 
* β β < , where
* (0,1) β ∈  is a critical value of β  that gives  /0 NN dd πθ = . The existence proof 
of the critical value is as follows. Suppose  /0 NN dd πθ = , implying: 
** * ( 1)( ( 1) 2)( ) ' [( 2) (1 )] S N NS S p w pq β θ β βθ θ − −+ − = + +− . It is clear that since the RHS is 
negative, 
* β  in the LHS must be less than 1 (by definition it is greater than 0).  And (8b) can be 
proved analogously, by replacing 
* β  with 
** β , where 
* * β  is a critical value of β  that yields 
/0 SS dd πθ = .    
1
( ) '[ ' (1 ) ( )].
N
N S SS N N N
S
d






= + − −−
∆
 
Here, /0 NS dd πθ <  if  1 β < and  /0 NS dd πθ >  if  1 β > . We can straightforwardly prove for the 
case of  / NS dd πθ  in a similar way.   
( ' / )[ ( ) ' ( 1)] 0.
N
NS N N N
d
pqq p w pq
dt
π
θ = ∆− − − − >  
The proof for  /0 S d dt π <  can be done in a similar way straightforwardly.  QED 
 
A4: Proof for Lemma 3  
(i) Again we only prove the case for the North. After some calculations, using  / NN dw dθ , 
/ NN dq dθ  and  ' NN N pq w βθ = −  in Appendix A1, we can rearrange (9) as follows. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 11
' 2 13 12
N
N SN N N N N S N S
N
du
p q qu w qw
d
β
β β π θβ θθβ
θβ
 −
=+ −+− −+  ∆ 
, 
which is positive for  ( ) 0, β ∈∞ , since the expression in square brackets is positive: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 / ,1 N β βθ − ∈ −∞  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 13 12 0 SS θβ θβ −+ > −+ >. 
(ii) Straightforward from (7c) and (7d).    QED 
 
A5: Proof for Proposition 2    22 
We only prove the case for the North. That for the South can be done analogously. Suppose 
ε β − =
− 1  and  ε β + =
+ 1 , where  0 > ε  and small. Denote the optimal LS 
−
N θ  that satisfies 
/0 NN θ ∂Φ ∂ =  when  ε β − =
− 1 , and 
+
N θ  that satisfies  /0 NN θ ∂Φ ∂ =  when  ε β + =
+ 1 . 
Calculations give the following FOC:  
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Now, changing  ε β − =
− 1  to  ε β + =
+ 1  in the above FOC yields:  
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N NN βθ θ +− ∂Φ ∂  is not zero any more since 
−
N θ  is the optimal LS for the case of 
ε β − =
− 1 . To verify the sign, subtracting the former from the latter, we have: 









.            (A5-1) 
To see this, note first that  0 BA >> . And the term in front of B in 
, /|
N NN βθ θ +− ∂Φ ∂  is negative 
and has a larger absolute value than a similar term in front of A in 
, /|
N NN βθ θ −− ∂Φ ∂ . Thus, (A5-1) is 
negatively signed. Also, since 
, /|
N NN βθ θ −− ∂Φ ∂  is zero, we must have 
, /| 0
N NN βθ θ +− ∂Φ ∂ < . This 
implies that  || NN ββ θθ +−
+− < . Thus in general, we have 
**
11 || NN ββ θθ >< < , which is true under free 
trade as well. Refer to Figure 1.    QED 
 
A6: Proof for Proposition 3    23 
Again it suffices to prove the case for the North only. Under the optimal tariff, 
* t , the optimal LS 
*
N θ  satisfies, 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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  − −++ −  −      ∂Φ + − −+  ′ =∆+ =  
∂ 
− − −+ 

. 
Now consider a free trade system with t=0. Then from the above expression one can verify that 
0 / |0 N Nt θ = ∂Φ ∂ >  if  1 < β  and  0 / |0 N Nt θ = ∂Φ ∂ <  if  1 > β , which implies the proposition. These 
are illustrated in Figure 2.  QED 
 
A7: Proof for Proposition 4  
(i) Let us first prove the case for the South, whose welfare consists of firm profits and union utility, 
since consumption occurs in the North only. Figure 3 shows that an increase in LS raises firm 
profits and union utility if the union is sufficiently employment-oriented (i.e. if  ' ββ <  in Figure 3). 
If the union is wage-oriented ( 1 β > ), then an increase in LS reduces firm profits, but it still raises 
union utility. Therefore, the optimal LS can be still positive. It becomes zero only if the union is 
sufficiently wage oriented, at a point  '' ββ ≥ , where  / / /0 SS SS SS u θ πθ θ ∂ Φ∂= ∂ ∂+ ∂ ∂=  at 
'' β . Also, in the special case that the government does not care about union utility, the union utility 
does not enter the government’s objective function and thus the government chooses zero LS if 
' ββ >  (i.e.,  / /0 SS SS θ πθ ∂Φ ∂ = ∂ ∂ <  if  ' ββ > ). 
(ii) The proof for the North is more complicated, since Northern welfare includes consumer 
surplus and tariff revenue. Let us look at the case of near free trade, i.e.,  0 t ≈ , then the effect on 
the tariff revenue disappears. Since an increase in LS raises consumer surplus ( /0 N dd ϕθ > ) if 
1 β < , it moves the point for  /0 NN θ ∂Φ ∂ =  to the right of  '' β , say a point such as  ''' β . That is, 
only if  ''' ββ ≥ , then the Northern government would choose a zero level of LS.     QED   24 
 
 
A8: Proof for Proposition 5  
Suppose  NS ββ ≠ . Then, from Proposition 3, we have 
**
1, 0 1, 0 ||
NN Nt Nt ββ θθ >= >> < and 
**
1, 0 1, 0 ||
NN NtNt ββ θθ <> <= < ; and 
**
1, 0 1, 0 ||
SS StSt ββ θθ <> <= <  and 
**
1, 0 1, 0 ||
SS St St ββ θθ >= >> < . In addition, from 
Proposition 2, we obtain 
**
11 ||
NS NS ββ θθ >< <  and 
**
11 ||
SN SN ββ θθ >< <  given a level of the tariff. Using 
all these rankings, we derive (i) and (ii) in Proposition 5.  
For (iii) and (iv), it suffices to prove the case for the North only. First, for (iii), suppose that 
1 NS ββ = >  and the North chooses a 
*
N θ that satisfies the following FOC: 
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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  − −++ −  −      ∂Φ + − −+  ′ = ∆+ =  
∂ 
− − −+ 
 
. 
Given  S β , if  N β  further increases slightly, then  * ,' /| 0
NN NN θβ θ ∂Φ ∂ <  from the above FOC. The 
new optimal level of LS for the North becomes lower. As for (iv), suppose that  1 NS ββ = <  and 
the North chooses a 
*
N θ that satisfies the above FOC. Now, if  N β  further decreases slightly, we can 
similarly verify  * ,' /| 0
NN NN θβ θ ∂Φ ∂ > . And the new optimal level of LS for the North becomes 
higher.    QED 
' 1 '' ''' β ββ
 
/0 ii du dθ >  
/0 ii dd πθ >  
/0 ii dd πθ <  
/ 0, ( )/ 0 N SN d d d tq d ϕθ θ ><  
/ 0, ( )/ 0 N SN d d d tq d ϕθ θ <>  
Figure 3: Welfare decomposition   25 
 
A9: Proof for Proposition 6  
When plugging the individual optimal LS into the FOCs, the following equalities must hold, 
*** *
()
| | |0 |
NNN N
NS N S S
N NN N
θθθ θ θ θθ θ
∂ Φ +Φ ∂Φ ∂Φ ∂Φ
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+−  ≡ + = + + −−  ,  









≡ − +− . 
D is positive if  1 β >  and negative if  1 β < , while E is always positive. Therefore, if  1 β > , we 
have  ** ( ) /| /| 0
NN NS N SN θθ θθ ∂ Φ + Φ ∂= ∂ Φ ∂> ; that is, the optimal LS under economic integration 
is greater than without integration. If  1 β < ,  ** ( ) /| /|
NN NS N SN θθ θθ ∂ Φ +Φ ∂ = ∂Φ ∂  is either 
positive or negative, depending on the relative size of D and E. 









, where G and K can be written similarly as D and E, with the 
subscripts N and S switched. Since the Northern government cares about consumer surplus, G 
shows that an increase in the Southern LS brings ambiguous effects. However, if we assume β  is 
not extremely high or small, the bracket in G becomes positive. Then, if  1 β > , 
** ( ) /| /| 0
SS NS S NS θθ θθ ∂ Φ + Φ ∂= ∂ Φ ∂> , implying that the optimal LS with economic integration is 
greater than without integration; If  1 β < ,  ** ( ) /| /|
SS NS S NS θθ θθ ∂ Φ +Φ ∂ = ∂Φ ∂  is either positive or 
negative, depending on the relative size of G and K.    QED 
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